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A widely agreed proposition in modern economics is that policy rules 
have greater advantage over discretion in improving economic performance. 
Simple monetary policy instrument rules are feasible options for developing 
countries lacking the pre-requisites for more sophisticated targeting rules. 
Notwithstanding the focus of modern literature on the issue, the State Bank of 
Pakistan (SBP) has never declared itself to be following any type of rule. 
Surprisingly, this topic has remained out of research focus (among the academia 
and the practitioners) in Pakistan. This is the first attempt to deal with a rule-
based monetary policy strategy in the case of the SBP. We have estimated the 
Taylor rule and simulated the economy using this rule as a monetary policy 
strategy. Our results indicate that the SBP has not been following the Taylor 
rule. In fact, the actual policy can be taken as an extreme deviation from it. On 
the other hand, counterfactual simulation confirms that macroeconomic 
performance can be improved, in terms of stability in inflation and output, when 
a simple Taylor rule is adopted. In this regard the parameter values (especially 
the inflation target) in the rule must be set according to the conditions of the 
economy under consideration rather than by relying on the ones suggested by 
the Taylor rule. 
 
JEL classification:  E47, E31, E52 









The most agreed upon proposition in the modern macroeconomics is that 
policy rules have greater advantage over discretion in improving economic 
performance, [Taylor (1993)]. Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and 
Gordon (1983) have convincingly put forward that discretionary policies are 
time inconsistent. Specifically stating, low inflationary policy becomes 
dynamically inconsistent in the presence of discretionary powers to monetary 
authority with the economic agents having rational expectations. Barro and 
Gordon (1983a) highlighted that punishment by private agents to the policy 
maker in case of acting against the announced rule, and the reputation problem 
faced by the monetary authority are solutions to the time inconsistency problem. 
Regarding this issue, Rogoff (1985) has suggested delegation of powers to 
conservative central banker who is known to be inflation averse. Similarly, 
Walsh (1995) established that punishment criterion set in the central banker’s 
contract could be a possible solution to the time inconsistency problem.  
Whereas all this research confirms that rules are superior to discretion but 
it offers no clue as to how the rules could be used in practical policy making 
process. Taylor has resolved this issue in 1993, who offered a rule that is both 
practicable and simple. It suggests setting the short interest rate (monetary 
policy instrument) based on the state of the economy. Precisely, it calls for 
changes in the interest rate in response to deviation of output from trend or 
potential level and that of inflation from the target with equal weight given to 
both objectives in the policy reaction function. In this way policy maker would 
be able to solve the time inconsistency problem of optimal policies and this 
simple rule has the potential to improve macroeconomic performance. Similarly 
it does not have the problem of enforcement, highlighted by Barro and Gordon 
(1983a), as it is easily verifiable by an agent outside the central bank. In this 
sense commitment to this rule is technically feasible.  
Pakistan has experienced cycles in inflation and real economic activity in 
the history. Inflation reached the peak at 23 percent in 1974, and touched the 
lowest of 2.44 percent in 2002. Similarly the real output growth varied between 
8.7 percent in 1980 and –0.1 percent in 1997. This indicates poor 
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macroeconomic performance, as it is now abundantly clear that a country cannot 
graduate from low-income to middle-income economy status unless it has 
sustained high growth with stable inflation, [e.g. Fischer (1993)].
1  On the other 
hand, being a developing country, Pakistan has institutions that are not yet 
strong and independent. There is fiscal pressure and a constant struggle for 
exchange rate stabilisation by the monetary authority. Therefore, simple 
instrument rule—like the Taylor rule might be a feasible option even though it 
may not be the optimal and it could serve as a first step to move from discretion 
to more elaborate inflation targeting framework.
2  
In this study Taylor rule for Pakistan has been estimated to establish 
whether or not the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has been following such a rule.
3 
Another issue that is addressed is the investigation of how a simple monetary 
policy rule (Taylor rule here) can improve macroeconomic performance given 
the constraints in a developing country. The study also investigates whether the 
parameter values (the weights on output and inflation stabilisation, and the target 
inflation rate) in the rule suggested by Taylor are optimal for a country like 
Pakistan or they require changes as the original values were Fed specific.  
To accomplish these objectives, we have estimated the Taylor rule using 
Pakistani data for the period 1991–2005. In the second step the macroeconomic 
performance has been evaluated through counter factual simulations. While 
doing so, the Neo-Keynesian type transmission mechanism given by Svensson 
(1997) and estimated by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), has been estimated 
for Pakistan and Taylor rule is assumed to be the monetary policy strategy. 
Finally to find the optimal weights on inflation and output in the reaction 
function and the optimal inflation target for Pakistan, economy has been 
backcasted with different values of these parameters and then standard 
deviations of inflation and output and the loss associated with each set of 
parameter values are compared. To confirm our results, we have used stochastic 
simulation instead of just relying on the historical simulation.
4  
It has been found that the State Bank of Pakistan has never followed the 
Taylor rule (in any of the governors’ period). In fact, given the level of inflation 
and output, the Taylor rule would have recommended a much more aggressive 
response of monetary policy than the actual policy setting had been during 1991-
2005. We have found that the output gap and inflation explain only one fourth of 
the variation in the interest rate. This indicates that the focus of monetary policy 
                                                 
1Variable inflation creates uncertainty for the economic agents in which case they are unable 
to take optimal decisions. In this way inflation variability is harmful for economic growth. 
2As instrument rules are simple, robust, easily verifiable and strict and there is 
fundamentally no role of policy maker’s judgement in time to time decisions, commitment to these 
rules is a good and feasible monetary policy strategy for developing countries. Compared to this, 
targeting rules (due to Svensson) are even though optimal and flexible, but not simple. 
3The objective here is not to estimate actual reaction function of the SBP but is to just 
explore whether SBP has been following Taylor rule or not. 
4For that matter we have used bootstrap simulation to resample our estimated shocks.  
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in Pakistan has not been limited to only two objectives (in the Taylor rule) and 
there are other monetary policy objectives that may have taken preference over 
inflation and output stabilisation. On the other hand simulation results have 
confirmed that the macroeconomic performance could have improved had the 
Taylor rule been followed. Both the inflation and the output variability would 
have been less and similarly the loss to the society would have been reduced 
with the Taylor rule based monetary policy. The stochastic simulation has also 
confirmed these results, as the better performance by the Taylor rule could not 
be rejected even in a number of different scenarios.  
With respect to the optimal parameter values in the rule, it has been found 
that the macroeconomic performance could have improved even better by 
putting equal weight in the rule to the objectives of output stabilisation and 
inflation with an inflation target of 8 percent
5. The second best possibility has 
been found to put all the weight on output stabilisation in the reaction function. 
Constrained numerical optimisation and bootstrap simulation have confirmed 
these results. So the main result we have drawn is that simple instrument rule – 
like the Taylor rule could perform much better than discretionary policy could, 
but the parameter values in the rule must be adjusted carefully according to the 
circumstances of a country.  
Remainder of the study proceeds as follows. In Section 2 both types of 
monetary policy rules, namely instrument as well as targeting rules are defined 
and explained. It also deals with the characteristics of simple instrument rules in 
developing countries perspective. Methodology for estimation, backcasting, 
simulation and numerical optimisation is given in Section 3. Next section 
explains in detail the empirical results. Finally Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  MONETARY POLICY RULES 
A monetary policy rule can be defined as a description-expressed 
algebraically, numerically, graphically-of how the instruments of policy, such as 
monetary base or the discount rate, changes in response to economic variables 
[Taylor (1999b)]. Policy rules are not only like constant growth rate rule for 
money supply, but feedback rules, such as money supply response to changes in 
unemployment and/or inflation etc are also considered as policy rules. In the 
area of exchange rate policy, a fixed exchange rate system is clearly a policy 
rule, but so are adjustable or crawling pegs.  
As stated earlier, there is substantial consensus among macro economists 
that the policy rules have greater advantages over discretion in improving 
economic performance.  Precisely discretionary policy is referred to as the 
“inconsistent” solution in dynamic optimisation problems. It could be argued 
                                                 
5The coefficients of output gap and inflation are same as proposed by Taylor but inflation 
target is different to what is taken by Taylor.  
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that advantage of rules over discretion is like the advantage of a cooperative 
over a non-cooperative solution in game theory. However, if a policy rule is to 
be used for macroeconomic growth and stabilisation then it should be in place 
for a reasonable long period of time, to gain the advantages of credibility 
associated with that rule.  
After the consensus in 1980s on superiority of the rules over discretion, 
another debate started in early 1990s on the structure or formulation of the rules. 
There are two types of monetary policy rules in the literature: simple instrument 
rules [proposed by McCallum (1988); Taylor (1993) and others] and targeting 
rules [due to Svensson (1997, 2002, 2003)]. This debate concerns the issues like 
simplicity, robustness, reliability, practicability, international practices, technical 
feasibility, results orientation and role of policy maker’s judgement in different 
policy rules. Before going to this discussion, especially in the developing 
countries perspective, we first define these two types of rules, (especially the 
Taylor rule) and outline their characteristics.  
 
2.1.  Instrument Rules 
Simple instrument rules specify monetary policy instrument as a function of 
the state of the economy (information about which is available to the central bank). 
These rules are simple to follow and require little amount of information. They are 
also robust and technically feasible in the sense that commitment to them is easily 
verifiable. Examples of these rules are Meltzer (1987), McCallum (1988), Taylor 
(1993), Henderson and McKibbin (1993) etc. The most famous and the one that 
attracted a large amount of research in 1990s is the Taylor (1993) rule. Taylor (1993) 
offered an instrument rule to conduct monetary policy operations: setting the target 
for federal funds rate (monetary policy instrument) equal to an “equilibrium” real 
funds rate plus the current inflation and adding to it a weighted average of monetary 
authority’s response to the deviation of current inflation from the target and 
percentage deviation of the real GDP from an estimate of its potential or full-
employment level. He argues that this rule represents “good” policy in the sense that 
it relates a plausible Fed instrument to reasonable goal variables, and it stabilises 
both inflation and output reasonably well in a variety of macroeconomic models.
6  




* π − π α + α + π + = t t t t y r i   … … …  (1) 
where r* is the long run equilibrium real interest rate, πt is the current inflation 
rate (Taylor takes this as last four quarters average including the current 
quarter), π* is the target inflation rate and yt is the deviation of output in period t 
from its long run trend.  
                                                 
6This indicates the robustness of the rule.  
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This rule suggests interest rate setting by the Fisher hypothesis in the 
absence of deviation of output from the potential level and inflation from the 
target. In this case, the interest rate would simply be equal to 4 percent as Taylor 
took both the values of r* and πt as 2 percent. However if there is deviation of 
either inflation from the target or output from the normal level then interest rate 
would be adjusted according to the rule. The response coefficient on both output 
gap and inflation deviation is taken as 0.5.  
It should be emphasised here that the coefficients must fulfill the 
restrictions that α1 > 0 and α2 > 0 to have macroeconomic stability. Because if 
say, coefficient on inflation deviation is less than zero then a rise in inflation 
would lead to an interest rate cut, which will induce increased spending. This 
would tend to increase aggregate demand, thereby further increasing inflation 
(an unstable solution). Where as if it is greater than zero then this instability 
doesn’t arise, because then Taylor rule ensures that inflation is equal to its 
targeted value π* [Taylor (1999a)].  
Instrument rules are simple and explicit reaction functions and hence they 
are easy to follow. They require little amount of human capital (team of 
professionals) that take timely decisions depending on the state of the economy. 
What is required is just to make a rule that has good theoretical properties and is 
expected to perform well, no matter what the transmission mechanism or the 
state of the economy is. In this regard, the policy maker is supposed to follow it 
mechanically. It is worth discussing here that Taylor (1993) warns on the 
mechanical use of this rule and suggests its use as a guideline to central bankers 
while taking monetary policy decisions. But the rule is structured as to not allow 
the deviation from the rule, thereby making policy maker to follow it 
mechanically [Svensson (2003)]. In this case central bankers just need to have 
information on the variables included in the rule and then rule guides them to 
take actions according to the condition then. In this case what is needed for 
policy making is just “a clerk armed with a simple formula and a hand 
calculator” [McCallum (2000)]. So there is fundamentally no role of policy 
maker’s judgement in policy decisions. Once the rule is set, perfect knowledge 
about transmission mechanism is even not required in policy making.
7  
Similarly these rules are robust and reliable—the important 
characteristics for a rule to be prescribed for an economy. By robustness we 
mean that a rule should perform reasonably well in different macroeconomic 
models, with different estimates of potential output and equilibrium real interest 
rate and with different inflation targets. Similarly a rule is reliable if it could 
                                                 
7It does not mean however that this knowledge is not required at all. It is necessary to 
understand the transmission mechanism while making a rule for a country. After all, if say interest 
rate does not affect the aggregate demand of a country then why should there be simple interest rate 
rule. So what we mean by unimportance of this knowledge here is that once the rule is set and 
monetary authority is committed to follow it, no further knowledge on transmission mechanism is 
required.   
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produce results at least as good as in a period that is thought to be golden in 
monetary policy history. Instrument rules are robust in different macroeconomic 
models for the economy; see for instance, McCallum (1988), Levin, Wieland 
and Williams (1999), Rudebusch (2002) among others. One of the problems 
with rules discussed by Barro and Gordon (1983b) is commitment to the rule 
because policy maker has the temptation to deviate from the announced rule to 
gain short term benefits in terms of output and employment. Because of 
simplicity and requirement of response to small data set, instrument rules do not 
carry such problem. An observer outside the central bank can easily judge 
whether the rule is being followed or not, making it costly for the policy maker 
to deviate from the announced rule. In this sense commitment to these rules is 
technically feasible. In nutshell, we can say that instrument rules are simple, 
robust, reliable and strict and commitment to them is technically feasible. 
 
2.2.  Targeting Rules 
In 1990s some of the central banks adopted much more elaborate 
framework to keep inflation on target and output on the track. This type of 
framework was adopted without any strong academic research/recommendation. 
Later on however, a considerable research has been done in this area and the 
framework is now known as ‘inflation targeting’ or ‘inflation forecast targeting’ 
in the literature. This framework is also like a rule with some discretion given to 
central banks with in the given limits. This type of rule is known as targeting 
rule due to Svensson (2002). In this framework central banks announce a 
numerical inflation target (point target or target range) and monetary policy has 
legislated mandate for achieving that inflation target with clear instrumental 
independence. In the whole process there is a high degree of monetary policy 
transparency and accountability of concerned authorities. Inflation forecast is 
taken as the intermediate target. Central bank sets instrument so that inflation is 
forecasted to be on target. This type of framework can best be termed as 
“constrained discretion” as Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) stated.  
There are two types of targeting rules, “general targeting rule” and 
“specific targeting rule”. A general targeting rule specifies an operational loss 
function, which the monetary policy is committed to minimise. In specific 
targeting rule, a condition for setting the instrument is specified, e.g. marginal 
rate of transformation and substitution between the target variables is equalised. 
It gives an implicit reaction function of the monetary authority that needs not to 
be announced. According to this type of framework central banks collect large 
amount of data and then formulate the policy in a complex way. Such a 
framework can best describe the strategy adopted by most of the inflation 
targeting central banks. This type of rule has good theoretical base, as there is no 
simple representation of reaction function. Here condition for instrument path is 
described by optimal first order Euler conditions and central bank behaviour is  
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not modeled in a mechanical way. There is also a clear role of judgment in 
monetary policy making, [Svensson (2005)]. 
 
2.3.  Characteristics of the Instrument Rules in  
        Developing Countries Perspective  
Developing countries have weak institutions, small information set, low 
capacity of professionals and monetary policy having multiple objectives 
without clear prioritisation. Calvo and Mishkin (2003) identify five fundamental 
institutional problems in developing countries: weak fiscal institutions, weak 
financial institutions, low credibility of monetary institutions, currency 
substitution and liability dollarisation and finally the vulnerability of the 
developing countries to sudden stops in capital inflows.  In this situation 
simplicity of the instrument rules might be more attractive for these countries as 
they face the constraint of human capital for optimal decisions from time to 
time. Wrong judgement by the policy makers at a particular time may lead to 
undesirable consequences. So a simple instrument rule that is to be followed 
mechanically could be the best policy prescription for developing countries. But 
at the same time this simplicity characteristic may be a disadvantage of the rule 
here because developing countries have complex economic structure. These 
economies are subject to external shocks and monetary policy has objectives 
other than output and inflation stabilisation like exchange rate management and 
fulfillment of the fiscal needs etc. In this case simple monetary policy rules may 
not be a good policy option if they don’t incorporate these other objectives of 
the policy that may take preference over output and inflation in a particular time 
period. If these objectives are included in the rule then it no more remains 
simple. So there is a tradeoff between simplicity and completeness (in terms of 
incorporating all of the objectives) of the rule.   
At the same time these simple rules might be attractive for these countries 
as having multiple objectives of monetary policy without clear prioritisation 
may lead to deviation from the rule in certain situations. As outsiders can easily 
verify commitment to the simple instrument rules, this property makes it costly 
for the central banks to deviate from the rule. Similarly the credibility problem 
of monetary institutions could be solved with this type of rules. As the simple 
rules are easy to verify, monetary authorities can invest in their reputation by 
committing themselves to such a rule. One other point that is worth discussing 
here is that, due to complex structure of the economy, knowledge about 
transmission mechanism is limited in developing countries. Estimates of 
equilibrium real interest rate and potential output are rough. In this case a simple 
rule can be prescribed for policy making only if it is quite robust. As discussed 
above, simple instrument rules are robust in different economic models and with 
different measures of output gap, real interest rate and inflation. With these 
characteristics the simple rules are attractive for the developing countries and  
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could serve as the first step for moving from discretionary policies to more 
elaborate rule based monetary policy framework. 
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
Since 1993 when Taylor presented a simple instrument rule for monetary 
policy, a handsome amount of research has been done in this area. Three issues 
regarding this rule have been discussed much in the literature (theoretical and/or 
empirical): positive analysis, robustness and economic performance by the rule. 
As discussed in the introduction, the objective of this study is not to identify the 
policy reaction function of the State Bank of Pakistan. Rather we are interested 
in comparing actual policy with that suggested by the Taylor rule. It has also 
been investigated whether the economic performance would have improved had 
the Taylor rule was followed. In this regard, the optimal inflation target, 
equilibrium real interest rate and optimal weights on output and inflation in the 
Taylor rule for Pakistan have been estimated. Below we explain the 
methodology for these estimations.  
 
3.1.  Estimation  
For the first objective of the study, two methodologies can be adopted: 
standard regression techniques that we use more frequently and simple 
comparison of actual and simulated data, that Taylor (1993) used. With respect 
to the first method, Taylor rule can be written as: 
it = r* + πt + α1yt + 
*
2 α  (πt – π*)    … … … …  (2) 
where  
r* – Long run equilibrium real interest rate 
it    – Short interest rate taken as monetary policy instrument 
πt  – Previous four quarters (including the current one) average inflation 
yt  – Output gap calculated as percentage deviation of actual output from 
the normal level. 
π* – Long run inflation target of the central bank 
There are four parameters, r*, π*, α1 and 
*
2 α  in Equation 2 that have been taken 
by Taylor as, respectively, 2 percent, 2 percent, 0.5 and 0.5. Here it is assumed 
that central bank has the information on current output and inflation. 
The above rule 1.2 can easily be converted into estimable form as 
t t t y i π α + α + α = 2 1 0   … … … … …  (3)   
where  * * 2 0 π α + + α r    
) 1 (
*
2 2 α + = α   
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Now the parameter values become α0 = 1, α1 = 0.5 and α2 = 1.5 
These are the values if a central bank is exactly or strictly following the 
rule. However, if this is not the case, then following conditions must hold: 
1 α > 0 and 1 2 ≥ α  
otherwise the system would be unstable. The second condition is known as 
‘Taylor Principle’ in the literature, [for instance, Taylor (1999); and Woodford 
(2001)]. If intercept in Equation 3 is negative then either real interest rate is 
negative or target level of inflation is high (atleast more than double the real 
interest rate).   
If the objective is to just estimate Taylor rule and not the actual policy 
reaction function (as is the case here), equation 3 should be estimated by OLS. 
Some other techniques like TSLS, GMM, VAR based approaches etc may 
improve estimation efficiency but at the cost of the loss of rule’s theory, as the 
rule specifies interest rate as a linear function of output gap and inflation. 
However the statistical inference makes sense only if the variables in equation 3 
are stationary. But if the estimated residuals are stationary then OLS estimates 
of Equation 3 are super consistent and integration of the variables in the 
equation does not create any problem, [e.g. Enders (2004)].
8  For that matter we 
have estimated the Equation 3 by OLS and unit root test is applied on the 
estimated residuals of the equation. 
In the second procedure, short term interest rate has been simulated with 
actual data on output and inflation and assuming Taylor rule as monetary policy 
strategy. If the central bank has been following the Taylor rule then both series 
(actual and simulated) must be close to each other with almost the same 
behaviour and basic statistics like mean, range, standard deviation etc. Taylor 
(1993) uses this method to evaluate the Fed’s policy. The method is somewhat 
less sophisticated but can perform very well in identifying the behaviour of 
monetary policy with reference to such a simple rule.  
 
3.2.  Macroeconomic Performance  
For the economic performance, economy has been simulated with Taylor 
rule as the monetary policy strategy and then the macroeconomic performance 
has been evaluated on the basis of variability in inflation and output and loss to 
the society. This analysis has been done both with the historical as well as 
stochastic simulation. For that matter some issues need to be further discussed 
here. First is the macroeconomic model on the basis of which the economy has 
been simulated. The modern macroeconomic literature carries three types of 
                                                 
8If linear combination of non-stationary variables is stationary then variables are said to be 
cointegrated. In Engle-Granger two-step methodology, regression with non-stationary variables is 
estimated and then in the second step, unit root test is applied on the estimated residuals from the 
equation, estimated in the first step.   
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transmission mechanisms (macroeconomic models): Lucas-type expectations-
augmented Phillips curve, Neo-Keynesian and New-Keynesian models, [see 
Cukierman (2002) for discussion on these models]. We have used here Neo-
Keynesian type model given by Svensson (1997) and estimated by Rudebusch 
and Svensson (1999)
9.  According to Svensson (1997), although simple, the 
model has well theoretical properties and captures essential features of the more 
elaborate models, which some of the central banks are using for policy analysis. 
The model is fully backward looking and assumes price rigidity in the 
economy
10. The model can be described by the following two equations along 
with the central bank’s reaction function given in Equation 3, 
t t t t t u i y y + π − β + β = − − − ) ( 1 1 2 1 1     … … … …  (4) 
t t t t y ε + γ + π γ = π − − 1 2 1 1     … … … … …  (5) 
with the parameter restrictions ,  1 β >0,  2 β <0,  1 β <1,  1 γ >0,  2 γ >0 and  1 γ <1. 
As prices are assumed to be rigid, central bank could affect aggregate 
demand through changes in the real interest rate. Output is affected by one 
period lagged real interest rate and its effect on inflation is even one period later 
and indirect. Again this model can be estimated by OLS as long as the variables 
in the model are stationary and there is no cross and contemporaneous 
correlation between the residuals of the two equations in the model. If the 
variables are non-stationary then this property can be imposed in the estimation 
and restricted OLS can be used to estimate the model [Rudebusch and Svensson 
(1999)]. Similarly if there is contemporaneous correlation across the equations 
then the system should be estimated as a Seemingly Unrelated (SUR) model.  
 
3.3.  Loss Minimisation 
The last objective concerns finding optimal parameter values in the rule 
for Pakistan. This has been done by backcasting the economy with different 
combinations of the parameters in the rule and then comparing these results. The 
optimal set of parameters is the one, which decreases output and inflation 
variability and hence minimises the loss to the society measured by equation 6. 
Again to find the statistical significance of this set of parameters, stochastic 
simulation (by bootstrapping the errors) has been used. Optimal parameter 
values have also been found here by constrained numerical optimisation (in a set 
of continuous parameter values). For that matter the loss function [from 
                                                 
9Estimation of the first and the last requires the assumption of rational expectations and 
fixed values for some of the parameters. Rational expectations hypothesis has not been tested in 
Pakistan yet and we do not have previous studies to take from which fixed values for some of the 
parameters. 
10In the case of Pakistan, inertia in output and inflation is consistent with VAR study by 
Malik (2006).  
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Svensson (2002)] is given by the following equation and the constraints are two 
equations 4 and 5 of the macroeconomic model described above. 
)] ( var ) var( [
2
1
t yt Lt π β + α =     … … … ..  (6)   
The loss function is defined over the variances of output gap and inflation 
respectively and α and β are relative weights assigned by the society to different 
objectives, i.e. the society’s preferences about output and inflation. 
 
4.  ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
4.1.  Estimating the Taylor Rule for Pakistan 
To see whether the State Bank of Pakistan has been following the Taylor 
rule, we have adopted two different methods as described in section 3. With the 
first methodology, we have estimated the Taylor rule for Pakistan for the period 
1991-2005 using quarterly data on call money rate (short interest rate taken as 
monetary policy instrument), CPI inflation and real output gap.  The results 
clearly indicate that the actual policy of the State Bank of Pakistan does not 
correspond to the Taylor Rule. Coefficient of output gap has opposite sign while 
that of inflation has magnitude different to what is prescribed by Taylor (1993), 
as shown in Equation 7.
11  Residuals series from this estimated equation is 
stationary as null of the unit root in ADF test is easily rejected at conventional 
level of significance. So the results from this equation are super consistent. 
it = 4.34 – 0.38 yt + 0.51 πt    … … … … …  (7)         
                (4.28) (–2.28)    (4.17) 
Adjusted R
2 = 0.22,   DW= 0.89 
ADF-stats for residuals = –4.11 
There are a number of issues to be discussed here regarding these results. 
First, it is clear from the estimated equation that State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) 
has not been following the rule proposed by Taylor (1993). This should not be 
of any surprise as SBP has never claimed to follow such rule. History of SBP 
shows that policy was ineffective and mainly was designed by the government 
before 1990s. As a part of financial sector reforms, monetary policymaking 
became independent, though partially, of the government in the beginning of the 
last decade. Since then it is the responsibility of the SBP to conduct monetary 
policy and it has been done in a discretionary framework.  
The second issue is about the coefficient of output gap. According to the 
estimated Taylor rule for Pakistan, SBP had been increasing interest rate or 
contracting money whenever the economy was in recessionary phase (output was 
below trend) and policy had been loosed whenever there was inflationary pressure or 
                                                 
11t-stats in parentheses.  
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the output was above the trend or potential level. This behaviour is not only in 
conflict with what is suggested by Taylor (1993), but also is strange and difficult to 
interpret with the help of economic theory. One of the possible explanations for such 
results is that, being the central bank of a developing country, SBP would not like to 
lean against the wind in an economy that is less elastic to policy changes. It is more 
affected by the external shocks than by the internal policies. So whenever the 
economy starts growing by some exogenous factor, the SBP does not want to lower 
its momentum. In this case even when output gap is positive, interest rate is not 
increased due to the fear of loosing higher economic growth and loose policy 
remains in force. Being a developing country the objective of output may take 
preference over that of inflation. This reasoning may well explain the estimated 
results if we just take the case of positive output gap. But it is difficult to explain the 
behaviour in the opposite scenario that is increasing interest rate in recessions. 
Anyhow we cannot ignore the possibility of getting such results in a country where 
central bank’s loss function may contain monetary policy objectives other than 
output and inflation and the reaction function is misspecified without including those 
objectives in the estimation, Malik (2007). 
  The third issue is regarding the coefficient of inflation. We are well 
aware of the Taylor principle that the response of the central bank must be at 
least one for one to inflation; otherwise the system would be divergent. 
Theoretically the intuition is much clear: if central bank looses monetary policy 
when inflation is above target then prices can potentially move without bounds. 
We have found the coefficient of inflation substantially less than one. This 
implies pro-cyclical response of monetary policy to the business cycle. Again 
this may be due to the external shocks in the economy and the factors affecting 
inflation other than those in the monetary sector.  
Fourth, the R
2 is only 0.22 indicating that only about one fourth of the 
variation in short interest rate is explained by the output gap and inflation. It 
opens the door for the research on identification of the factors, other than output 
gap and inflation that play important role in monetary policy. Pakistan is a 
developing country that may have other monetary policy objectives like, 
exchange rate stability, interest rate smoothing, financial sector stability etc. 
This might also be one of the reasons, why a country like Pakistan hesitates to 
follow a rule that does not address these issues.  
Fifth, the value of the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics clearly indicates 
that there is a high degree of autocorrelation in the estimated SBP’s reaction 
function. This is a clear signal that either SBP has the objective of interest rate 
smoothing or again there are missing variables in the above regression (8). So 
instead of making a policy in line with the Taylor type rule that may have 
increased the interest rate volatility, SBP preferred to smooth the interest rate.
12  
                                                 
12However some variants of the Taylor rule are proposed that deal with interest rate 
smoothing but the weight on this objective is not yet agreed upon.  
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Regarding the second methodology, it can be seen from Figure 1 and 
Table 1 that the rule induced and the actual short interest rate have much 
different behaviour. The latter has lower average level as well as the lesser 
fluctuation than the former has. Except for the period 1997-99 and 2002-04 
actual interest rate has little fluctuations on average. It means that rule would 
have suggested more aggressive response to output and inflation fluctuations 
than what the SBP actually did. In the time period taken in this study, monetary 
policy remained less aggressive in keeping output and inflation on track. This is 
why both the level of and variation in the actual interest rate were quite low as 
compared to the rule induced interest rate, as given in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 
Actual and Rule-induced Short Interest Rate 
   Actual  Rule Induced*  
Mean 8.24  10.42 
Maximum 15.42  20.30 
Minimum 1.05  0.51 
Range 14.37  19.79 
Variance 11.80  32.96 
St. Deviation  3.44  5.74 
* We used actual data on output gap and inflation to calculate this rate. 
 
Fig. 1.  Actual and the Taylor Rule-induced Short Interest Rate 













































































































Next, following Judd and Rudebusch (1998), we have divided the data 
into three sub-samples (as given in Table 2) to see whether this policy behaviour 
was different for different Governors’ regimes or it was almost the same. Our 




Different Regimes of Governors 
Sub-sample Time  Period  Governor 
1  1991:01 – 1993:02  Hanfi 
2  1993:03 – 1999:04  Yaqub 
3  2000:01 – 2005:04  Ishrat 
 
but there were some differences across different regimes. In Hanfi’s period 
policy was mostly based on the factors other than output and inflation. This is 
evident from both the intercept and magnitudes of coefficients on inflation and 
output gap in Equation 8. An interesting result is that both coefficients (of output 
gap and inflation) have negative sign in that period. Yaqub’s period was almost 
in between the other two periods and very little variation in interest rate is 
explained by the two variables in the Taylor rule. But now in this case the 
coefficient of inflation is positive, although it is still less than one as shown in 
Equation 9. The Ishrat’s period is the only one with positive coefficient of 
output gap but inflation coefficient becomes negative again.  
it = 17.04 – 0.60 yt – 0.78 πt (Hanfi’s period)   …  …  …  (8)        
it = 8.68 – 0.08 yt – 0.19 πt    (Yaqub’s  period)    …  …  …  (9)    
it = 5.77 – 0.18 yt – 0.14 πt  (Ishrat’s period)   …  …  …  (10)          
 
4.2.  Macroeconomic Performance according to the Taylor Rule 
With respect to the second objective of the paper, we have backcasted the 
economy from the period 1992 through 2005 and measured the macroeconomic 
performance by estimating the society’s loss function defined over variability in 
inflation and output.
13  It is of no debate in the modern economic literature that 
the policy rules can perform better than the discretionary framework.
14  In this 
sub-section we present the results of backcasting with original Taylor rule (with 
same parameter values), so finding the optimal parameter values in the rule for 
Pakistan is left till the next subsection.  
Counterfactual simulations require estimation of the transmission mechanism 
(macroeconomic model) of the economy on the basis of which previous data can be 
regenerated with alternative monetary policy setting. For this purpose, we have 
estimated the Neo-Keynesian type model for Pakistan, given by Svensson (1997) and 
                                                 
13We assume here that society puts equal weight on inflation and output stability. 
14It is worth noting here that improved macroeconomic performance means less inflation 
and output variability in the economy. Although the level of these variables does matter but what is 
more important is their stability. Inflation variability is negatively correlated to growth because it 
generates uncertainty that distorts the agents’ economic decisions like saving, investment etc. see for 
instance Fischer (1994).  
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estimated by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) for U.S. The model has been estimated 
by OLS and results are given in the following Equations 11 and 12 (with t-stats in 
parenthesis).
15 All signs are according to the economic theory and coefficient values 
are in the sensible range. Output is affected by its own lagged values and average real 
interest rate over the previous four quarters. Inflation too has one-period inertia and 
also affected by the output gap in the previous quarter.  Another result is that inflation 
and output have almost the same inertia and inertia factor does not indicate the 
possibility of unit root in both the series.
16  These results also indicate somehow the 
determinants of inflation in Pakistan: results in Equation 12 show that only about one 
third of the inflation in Pakistan can be explained by monetary factors.  
) ( 27 . 0 53 . 0 1 1 1 − − − π − − = t t t t i y y     … … … …  (11)       
       (4.68)      (–3.96) 
S.E = 1.60,     DW = 2.08 
1 1 39 . 0 51 . 0 72 . 3 − − + π + = π t t t y    … … … …  (12)       
                 (3.89)  (4.61)    (1.88)   
S.E = 3.42,            DW = 2.04 
With this estimated model and assuming Taylor rule as monetary policy 
strategy, we have backcasted the economy, incorporating in each period the 
estimated shocks (to output and inflation) from Equations 11 and 12. The main 
result we have found is that Taylor rule would have performed better than 
discretionary policy did in the period under consideration as shown in table 3. 
The Taylor rule, if followed instead of discretionary setting, would have 
decreased the variability in output gap and inflation.  
To confirm the results and to avoid relying on just historical simulation 
(one time estimates), stochastic simulation have also been used. It has been done 
by bootstrapping the standard deviation of output and inflation. We have done 
this for 1000 times and present here the average results along with the standard 
errors of estimates. It is clear from Table 3 that our results (reduction in output 
and inflation variability) hold even if we take bootstrapped measure of variation. 
Similarly the probability (p-value) of standard deviation of rule based output gap 
and inflation being greater than the one found in the actual data is quite low. We 
have found only 20 out of 1000 times, standard deviation of simulated output 
gap greater than or equal to that of the actual data. It is the case for 100 times for 
inflation series. All these results show that Taylor rule could perform 
significantly better than the actual policy in the period 1991-2005.
17  
                                                 
15Results by SUR model and by FIML have been found almost the same as there is 
insignificant contemporaneous correlation between the residuals of the two equations in the model. 
16Here inflation equation has the intercept but the demand equation does not. The value of 
intercept indicates the average effect of missing values in that equation. 
17Comparison of actual and backcasted data on inflation, output gap and interest rate using 




Simulation with the Taylor Rule and the Estimated Model 
 Rule  based 
   Actual  One Time  Bootstrap*  p-value**
Average 8.28  9.24     
Interest Rate  St Deviation  3.53  3.18     
Average –0.24  –0.83     
Output gap  St Deviation  2.47  1.72 
1.80 (0.21)
(0.21) 0.002 
Average 7.36  7.00     
Inflation St  Deviation  4.31  3.50 
4.04 (0.47)
(0.47) 0.10 
  * Average of 1000 values of standard deviations in bootstrap simulation. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
** probability of standard deviation with rule being greater than that of actual data. 
 
4.3.  Finding Optimal Parameter Values for Pakistan 
Now coming to the issue of optimal parameter values (in Taylor rule) for 
Pakistan, first take the case of optimal inflation target. None of the central banks, 
with any monetary policy strategy, targets zero inflation.
18  Most of the central banks 
with inflation targeting as monetary policy strategy announce about 2 percent 
inflation target, though with some tolerance range. Taylor (1993) has also taken 
inflation target as 2 percent that corresponds to about 2 percent real economic 
growth of the USA. Pakistan is a developing country with a natural requirement for 
higher growth rate. Keeping inflation too low may badly affect economic growth. In 
this paper we have taken seven different inflation targets for simulation from which 
we have tried to choose the optimal one. 2 percent is taken to simulate the economy 
with original Taylor rule. Pakistan has experienced about 5 percent real GDP growth 
over the period 1980-2005. Keeping this in mind and according to the Taylor 
procedure we have taken 5 percent inflation as another target. As estimated by Khan 
and Senhadji (2001), threshold level of inflation for developing countries ranges 
from 7 percent to 11 percent and by Mubarik (2005), this level for Pakistan is 9 
percent. So we take five more values, 7 percent–11 percent.  
The long run equilibrium real interest rate has been calculated for 
Pakistan as difference between the average nominal interest rate and inflation 
over the periods, 1973-2005, 1981-2005 and 1991-2005 as shown in Table 4.
19  
Results do not show clear pattern over time but nevertheless in all the three 
periods the average real interest rate is close to zero. So we have taken the value 
of equilibrium real interest rate as zero for the benchmark and counterfactual 
simulation is repeated for different values, between one and minus one, of this 
parameter.  
                                                 
18As central banks are not inflation nutters in King (1997) terminology. 




Estimation of Long-run Real Interest Rate 
  1973–2005 1981–2005 1991–2005 
Average Interest Rate  8.34  8.01  8.24 
Average CPI Inflation  9.16  7.52  7.89 
Average  GDPD  Inflation  8.92 8.02 8.92 
Equilibrium Real Interest Rate*  –0.82  0.49  0.35 
Equilibrium Real Interest Rate**  –0.58  0.00  –0.68 
* when inflation is calculated as percentage growth in CPI. 
** when inflation is calculated as percentage growth in GDP Deflator. 
 
Finally we have estimated the optimal weights for output and inflation in 
the Taylor rule for Pakistan. Taylor (1993) has taken equal weights, i.e. 0.5 on 
both of the objectives, output and inflation. We have taken these weights as a 
first case. The other two possibilities have been taken as: either all of the weight 
given to the output stabilisation and no care about inflation deviation and vice 
versa. First possibility might be more attractive for the developing countries (at 
least with asymmetric response) where output is the primary and inflation is the 
secondary issue. The second possibility is obviously more attractive for the 
stable economies, which put more weight to inflation control or the price 
stability.
20  
We have taken these three sets of weights and seven different targets of 
inflation (total 21 cases) and backcasted the output, inflation and interest rate 
using estimated parameters and shocks in the macroeconomic model (1.11) and 
(1.12). We have found that variability in inflation is a decreasing function of the 
level of inflation target but the variability of output starts increasing above a 
certain level of inflation target. From the results of all 21 cases, we have selected 
the best set of parameter values for Pakistan on the basis of the minimised 
variability in both of the variables, inflation and output and the minimum values 
of the loss to the society.  
The first best set of parameter values with which the rule has performed 
well in reducing the variability of inflation and output is the case when the 
central bank puts equal weight to output and inflation stabilisation in the 
reaction function and targets inflation at 8 percent with zero real interest rate
21. 
The rule with this set of parameter values is given in equation 13. This roughly 
indicates the optimal level of inflation for Pakistan and the results are consistent 
with the findings of Mubarik (2005) (with threshold level of inflation for 
Pakistan as 9 percent) and of Khan and Senhadji (2001) (with threshold range of 
                                                 
20It should be noted however that none of the central banks, even the inflation targeting 
ones, practically do this, as inflation targeting is flexible in the sense that central banks put some 
weight on output stabilisation too, (Svensson 1997; and Ball 1999).  
21The coefficient values are same as proposed by Taylor but inflation target is different.  
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inflation for developing countries including Pakistan as 7-11 percent). 
According to the rule with this set of parameter values, SBP should simply set 
interest rate equal to the inflation if both inflation and output are on target. But 
in case of deviation of inflation from the target or that of output from the trend 
or normal level, the rule proposes the response with a coefficient of 0.5. 
) 8 ( 5 . 0 5 . 0 0 − π + + π + = t t t t y i    … … … …  (13)   
or 
t t t y i π + + − = 5 . 1 5 . 0 4  
Results for the measures of macroeconomic performance by the rule (both 
in case of historical as well as stochastic simulation) with the first best set of 
parameter values are given in Table 5. The procedure we have adopted here for 
comparison is again same as we discussed above in case of actual Taylor rule. 
From the table it is clear that the variability in output gap and inflation decreases 
as we move from discretionary policy to the Taylor rule with the first best set of 
parameter values for Pakistan. However the average values of the variables are 
somewhat greater in case of following the rule. Again to confirm these results and 
to find the probability of standard deviation of output and inflation in simulated 
series being greater than that in the actual series, we have used stochastic 
simulation to resample the estimated shocks and estimated the standard deviations 
1000 times. Our results show that variability of both the objectives remain lower 
even in the repeated simulation. In 1000 experiments average values of the 
standard deviations of output gap and inflation are significantly less than those in 
the actual data.
22 It has also been found that the probability of standard deviation 
of output and inflation, with rule as the monetary policy strategy, being greater 
than that in the actual data is quite low showing that variability could decrease 
significantly if the rule has been followed.  
 
Table 5 
Simulation with the First Best Set of Parameter Values 
   First Best Set   
      Actual  Historical Stochastic*  p-value** 
Average  8.28  8.08        Interest Rate 
St Deviation  3.53  3.11       
Average  -0.24  0.3       
Output Gap 
St Deviation  2.47  1.67  1.72 (0.24)  0.05 
Average  7.36  7.88       
Inflation 
St Deviation  4.31  3.49  3.91 (0.47)  0.2 
* Average of 1000 values of standard deviations in bootstrap simulation. 
** Probability of standard deviation with rule being greater than that of actual data. 
                                                 
22Comparison of actual and simulated data on inflation, output gap and interest rate using 
this proposed rule is given in Appendix A, Figure 3.   
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We have found the second best set of parameter values, which have the 
best performance among all of the other cases as: the central bank giving all the 
weight to the output stabilisation with no response to the inflation deviation 
from the target with zero real interest rate.  As there is no response to inflation 
deviation from the target, it does not matter what level of inflation is optimal to 
target. According to this set of parameter values, SBP should simply set interest 
rate equal to sum of actual inflation and the output gap as equation 14 indicates.  
*) ( 0 0 π − π + + π + = t t t t y i     … … … … …  (14)         
or 
t t t y i + π =  
We have also estimated the macroeconomic performance by the Taylor 
rule with the parameter values given in Equation 14 rather than taking those 
suggested by Taylor. We can see from Table 6 that variability in interest rate, 
output gap and inflation decreases as we move from discretionary policy to 
proposed Taylor rule for Pakistan.
23  Again the average values of all the three 
variables are somewhat greater in case of following the rule. Detailed 
comparison of actual and simulated data on inflation, output gap and interest 
rate with this proposed rule is given in Appendix A, Figure 4.  Again to confirm 
these results and to find the probability of standard deviation of output and 
inflation in simulated series being greater than that in the actual series, we have 
used stochastic simulation to resample the estimated shocks and estimated the 
standard deviations 1000 times. Our results show that variability of both the 
objectives remain lower even in the repeated simulation. In 1000 experiments 
average values of the standard deviations of output gap and inflation are 
significantly less than those in the actual data. It has also been found that the 
probability  of  standard   deviation   of  output  and  inflation,  with  rule  as  the 
 
Table 6 
Simulation with the Second Best Set of Parameter Values 
   Second Best Set    
      Actual  Historical Stochastic*  p-value** 
Average  8.28  8.17        Interest Rate 
St Deviation  3.53  2.58       
Average  –0.24  0.25       
Output Gap 
St Deviation  2.47  1.55  1.70 (0.20)  0.03 
Average  7.36  7.84       
Inflation 
St Deviation  4.31  3.62  4.18 (0.48)  0.2 
 * Average of 1000 values of standard deviations in bootstrap simulation. 
** Probability of standard deviation with rule being greater than that of actual data. 
                                                 
23By the proposed Taylor rule we mean the rule with parameter values found optimal for 
Pakistan.   
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monetary policy strategy, being greater than that in the actual data is quite low 




4.4.  Loss Function and Comparison of Parameter Values 
In the last sub-section above, for estimating the optimal parameter values 
(inflation target and weights on the two objectives) in the Taylor rule for 
Pakistan, we have used the criterion of minimising the variability in both output 
and inflation. It is even better if we calculate and compare the loss to the society 
associated with each set of parameter values. As the loss function includes both 
the objectives, it can do better job to find optimal parameter values. For 
estimating the loss function the formula given in equation 6 has been used. For 
convenience and to compare all the cases on the same ground we have assumed 
that the society puts equal weight on inflation and the output. We have 
backcasted the economy with estimated macroeconomic model (estimated 
parameters and shocks) and taking all sets of parameters (total of 21, as 
discussed above) one at a time and chose the best set of parameters that 
minimises the loss function.  
By the historical simulation we have again reached the same results as we 
have found in the comparison of standard deviations individually. We have 
found that the loss is minimum in case of 8 percent inflation target and equal 
coefficient values of output and inflation in the reaction function with real 
interest rate as zero.  The second best set of parameter values has been found 
exactly the same as was proposed by Taylor. However the third best set of 
parameters contains all the weight given by the monetary authority to the output 
in the reaction function. Again we have done stochastic simulation to confirm 
our findings. We have simulated the shocks series 1000 times and then 
calculated the value of the loss each time and present here (in Table 7) only the 
average results. We can see from the table that performance of the rule (with 
either set of parameters) remains better (on average) than in case of actual policy 
even in 1000 different scenarios. Average loss with each set of parameters has 
been calculated with a reasonable standard error. Results show that there is very 
low probability (0.02 in all cases) of loss, associated with the rule, being greater 
than that with actual policy setting indicating that in 1000 different scenarios 
980 times, the rule performed better than discretionary policy with either set of 
parameter values. Finally we have compared the results of rule with optimal set 
of parameter values for Pakistan to the one with actual values taken by Taylor. 
We can see from Table 7 that it is better to follow the Taylor rule with a change 
in inflation target for Pakistan rather than with that taken by Taylor. It is not 
surprising  as  Taylor  proposed  inflation  target  for  the  Fed  and not for all the  
                                                 




Loss Associated with Different Parameter Values for the Rule 
 Variance  Loss  to  Society   
 Output  Inflation  Historical  Stochastic* p-value** 
Actual Data  6.10  18.54  12.32     
First Best 














  * Standard error in parenthesis. 
** Probability of loss associated with rule being greater than that of actual data. 
 
central banks. Interestingly, in historical simulation, Taylor’s proposed 
parameter values are better than the second best possibility for Pakistan we have 
found in this study but opposite is true in stochastic simulation.  
 
4.5.  Constrained Numerical Optimisation 
We have tried, in section 4.3, to find optimal parameter values in the Taylor 
rule for Pakistan by choosing the parameter values from a discrete set containing 
only theoretically or practically feasible values. To countercheck those results, we 
have done constrained numerical optimisation to find optimal parameter values from 
a set of continuous parameter values. For this, the loss function 1.6 has been 
minimised subject to the two constraints in the macroeconomic model (Equations 11 
and 12) plus some other constraints on the parameters. With respect to these other 
constraints we have made the following different cases.  
Case-I 
(i). Sum of coefficients of output and inflation equals 1. 
Case-II 
(i).  Sum of coefficients of output and inflation equals 1. 
(ii). In case of only one period shock output gap converges to a level in 
the range of -0.1-0.1.  
Case-III 
  (i) Sum of coefficients of output and inflation equals 1. 
 (ii) In case of only one period shock, output gap converges to a level in 
the range of -0.1-0.1. 
(iii) In case of only one period shock, inflation converges to a level in the 




  (i) Sum of coefficients of output and inflation equals 1. 
 (ii) In case of only one period shock, output gap converges to a level in 
the range of -0.1-0.1. 
(iii) In case of only one period shock, inflation converges to a level in the 
range of inflation target ±  0.50. 
By taking two constraints from the transmission mechanism and one set 
from these five cases each at a time we have found the minimised value of the 
loss associated with certain parameter values in the rule. Our results in Table 8 
show that if we use the set of constraints in the first case then the loss is 
minimised at about 13.74 percent inflation target along with coefficients of 
output and inflation as, respectively, 0.42 and 0.58. Weights on output and 
inflation are almost the same as we have found above in section 4.3 and 4.4 but 
the results have changed significantly for the target level of inflation: it has 
increased from 8 percent to 13.74 percent.  
 
Table 8 








Case-I  13.74 0.42 0.58 7.42 
Case-II  8.11 0.42 0.58 7.47 
Case-III 7.96 0.41 0.59 7.47 
Case-IV 7.91 0.99 0.00 7.76 
 
When we have minimised loss function subject to the second set of 
constraints where output gap has been forced to converge to zero in response 
to a one time shock, inflation target has been found again 8 percent and the 
output and inflation coefficients remained the same as in case I. In the third 
case, by adding another constraint we have found similar results as in case 
II. In the next case we have increased just the range around inflation target 
for convergence and found that results have changed drastically. Inflation 
target has remained the same (8 percent) but all of the weight has been 
assigned to output stabilisation.  
In summary, we have found here the inflation target as 8 percent and 
coefficients of output and inflation in most of the cases almost equal (with 
slightly more weight given to the inflation) and all of the weight given to output 
stabilisation only in one case. These results confirm our finding, in sub-sections 
4.3 and 4.4, of optimal parameter values in the Taylor rule for Pakistan.   
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5.  CONCLUSION 
In this study the Taylor rule for Pakistan has been estimated for the 
period 1991-2005 and for the sub-samples of different Governors’ regimes in 
that period. We have found no evidence that State Bank of Pakistan has ever 
followed this type of rule. The coefficient of output gap has opposite sign and 
that of inflation has lesser magnitude than what the Taylor proposed. This might 
be due to the fact that being central bank of a developing country, SBP focuses 
on other policy objectives that have not been included in the simple Taylor rule 
estimation. We have also backcasted the output and inflation assuming Taylor 
rule as the monetary policy strategy. On the basis of both historical and 
stochastic simulation, it has been found that macroeconomic performance, in 
terms of less variability of output and inflation and small value of the loss to the 
society, could be improved significantly by the rule. We have also tried to 
estimate optimal parameter values in the rule for Pakistan. We have found that it 
is optimal for SBP to target 8 percent inflation giving equal weight to both the 
objectives, output and inflation, in the policy reaction function
25.  
We conclude here by summarising key messages from the study. First, 
our results are in line with the modern economic literature on monetary policy 
rules. Second, despite the lack of pre-requisites for more elaborate policy rules 
and with weak institutions, developing countries can get benefits by the 
commitment to simple instrument rules. As argued in this study, simple 
instrument rules might be a first step for developing countries to move from 
discretionary policy to more elaborate inflation targeting framework. Third, 
despite the fact that there are multiple objectives (other than output and 
inflation) of monetary policy in developing countries, a simple rule that focuses 
only on the two primary objectives can perform better in these countries. 
However possibilities of including other objectives in the simple rules may also 
be explored. Fourth, the parameters in the rule (especially the inflation target) 
must be adjusted according to the economic conditions of a specific economy.  
There are potential topics for future research in this area. Before adopting any 
policy rule it is essential to explore the monetary policy objectives in a country like 
Pakistan. Literature on the Taylor rule is still inconclusive on the coefficients of 
variables (other than output and inflation) in the policy reaction function. So a lot of 
research is needed to reach some firm conclusions on coefficients of these other 
variables. There is also a need to explore the ways and possibilities for developing 
countries to adopt more elaborate inflation targeting framework. In this regard the 
research is needed on pre-requisites (central bank independence, transparency and 
accountability of central bank actions) for this type of frameworks. These three 
notions might be outcome of the elaborate policy rules and not just the pre-requisites 
for it. Research in this area would be quite beneficial for developing countries where 
intuitions are not yet strong and there is weak focus on the issues like monetary 
policy transparency and accountability.     
                                                 
25These results are based on the assumption of zero real interest rate.  
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Appendix A     
Fig. 2.  
Actual and Taylor Rule-induced Short Interest Rate,  
Output Gap, and Inflation 
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Fig. 3. Actual and First Best Rule-induced Short Interest Rate,  
Output Gap, and Inflation 
 



















































































































































































































































































































Actual and Second Best Rule-induced Short Interest Rate,  
Output Gap, and Inflation 
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